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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Sup. Ct. No. 20010100-SC
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
Ct. App. No. 990987-CA
vs.
SHAYNE M. HANSEN,

Priority No. 14

Defendant/Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
* * *

Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State submits this brief
in reply to new issues raised in the respondent's brief or in this Court's decision in State v.
Eisner, 2001 UT 99, 37 P.3d 1073.
ARGUMENT
A. This Court Has Now Rejected the "Presumption Against Waiver" Test Applied
by the Court of Appeals Below.
The court of appeals below employed the following three-part test, heretofore referred
to as the " Villano" or "presumption against waiver" test, for determining whether defendant's
consent to search his vehicle was given voluntarily:
"(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was
'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given'; (2) the
government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express
or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, we] indulge
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived."
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State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, f 18, 17 P.3d 1135 (quotingState v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433,
439 (Utah App. 1996). On certiorari, the State has argued that the "presumption against
waiver" test should be renounced in favor of the "totality of the circumstances" test
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973), and consistently followed by this Court. See Pet. Brf. at 7-19.
This Court has since adopted the position espoused by the State here, Pet. Brf. at 1519, in State v. Eisner, 2001 UT 99, 37 P.3d 1073. The Court in Eisner observed that
Schneckloth "flatly rejected the requirement that the prosecution establish waiver in order to
demonstrate voluntariness," Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at \ 45, which is the very cornerstone of
the Villano test. The Court thus concluded that "to the degree [the Villano test] hinges
consent upon waiver—and to the extent our prior cases have not made our position perfectly
clear—we today explicitly reject the court of appeals' voluntariness test. . . ." Id. at f 47.
After rejecting the Villano test, the Eisner court reaffirmed the test enunciated in
Schneckloth'. "When assessing whether consent to a warrantless search was given voluntarily,
courts in Utah must follow the same analysis we have repeatedly applied since Schneckloth:
Consent is not voluntary if it is obtained as 'the product of duress or coercion, express or
implied.'" Id. {quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2041).
B. The Court of Appeals9 Application of the "Presumption Against Waiver"
Standard Did Not Constitute Dictum.
Defendant concedes that Eisner rejects the court of appeals' voluntariness test. See
Resp. Brf. at 9. Notwithstanding that concession, defendant maintains that the court of
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appeals "did not rely on those portions of [the test] that have been rejected." Resp. Brf. at
9. According to defendant, the now-defimct "presumption against waiver" standard simply
required a showing that the defendant was informed of the right to refuse consent to search
and that he or she waived that right. See Resp. Brf. at 9-13. He argues that because the court
of appeals did not address the need for an intelligent waiver, reference to that standard
constitutes dictum. See Resp. Brf. at 13, 41. This contention lacks merit.
As explained in the State's opening brief, see Pet. Brf. at 9, 15-17, the "presumption
against waiver" standard employed by the court of appeals not only required a showing that
defendant's consent was "intelligently" given, but also required the court to operate under
the presumption that defendant did not voluntarily consent to a search. As again explained
in the State's opening brief, Pet. Brf. at 15-17, Schneckloth rejected both requirements. See
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234,243,93 S.Ct. at 2051,2056 (holding that "knowledge of a right
to refuse is not a prerequisite of a voluntary consent" and that "it cannot be said [that] every
reasonable presumption ought to be indulged against voluntary relinquishment").
Defendant argues that because the case did not turn on the issue of informed consent,
reference in the case to the "presumption against waiver" standard is "inconsequential,"
"irrelevant," and "dictum." Resp. Brf. at 10-13. However, the court of appeals expressly
employed the primary component of the "presumption against waiver" test—indulging in the
presumption against waiver of the right to be free from an otherwise unlawful search. See
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, at f 18. In reviewing the circumstances of the consent, it did so
under the assumption that defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search. Under the
3

court's view, that presumption could not be rebutted unless the State produced "clear and
positive" testimony that voluntary consent to search was given. See id. atfflf20-21, 25-26
(insisting that testimony concerning consent be "clear and positive"). After reviewing the
record, the court of appeals concluded: "Therefore, because we indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, we hold that the trial
court erred in concluding that Hansen's consent was freely and voluntarily given." Id. at f
25 (emphasis added).
Because the "presumption against waiver" standard was expressly relied on by the
court of appeals in reaching its decision, it cannot be construed as mere dictum.
C. The Requirement That the State Produce Clear and Positive Testimony of
Consent Employs the "Presumption Against Waiver" Standard.
Defendant also argues that the requirement that the State produce "clear and positive"
testimony of consent "is another way of saying the State must prove consent with
'substantial, competent evidence' on the matter." Resp. Brf. at 15 (quoting Bisner, 2001 UT
99, at \ 42. That contention is nothing but an attempt to save the inappropriate requirement.
Defendant cites to no case, and the State has found none, which has equated that
language with the requirement that there must be "substantial, competent evidence"
supporting consent. Indeed, the very language requiring "clear and positive testimony"
implies a greater evidentiary burden than the preponderance of the evidence standard, which
defendant concedes is the appropriate evidentiary standard. See Resp. Brf. at 15-16. On its
face, the requirement appears to impose an evidentiary burden analogous to the "clear and
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convincing evidence" standard which carries a higher evidentiary standard of proof than the
preponderance standard. See Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, ^f 33, 20 P.3d 332. That is
improper.
Moreover, as discussed in the State's opening brief, the court of appeals' very
application of the "clear and positive testimony" requirement resulted in the imposition of
an inappropriate evidentiary burden. See Pet. Brf. at 24-27. Defendant attempts to justify
the conclusion of the court of appeals, contending that Officer Huntington's testimony was
merely conclusory. Resp. Brf. at 22-28. Yet, Officer Huntington testified that he asked
defendant for consent to check his car for alcohol, drugs, or weapons and that defendant
consented. R. 84: 17-18, 38-40. He frankly admitted that he did not recall the precise
language used, but never wavered in his testimony that defendant consented to the search.
See R. 84: 40-43. That trial court's finding of consent was thus "supported by substantial,
competent evidence." See Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at f 42 (quoting State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d
684, 687 (Utah 1990)).
As support for the State's position that the officer's testimony was sufficient to
support the trial court's finding of consent, it cited to the decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 336 (Penn. 1998). See Pet. Brf. at
27. As in the case here, the officer testified that the defendant answered "yes" when he asked
her if she would mind if he took a look inside her bag. Boswell, 721 A.2d at 338. Defendant
attempts to distinguish Boswell, contending that the officer later clarified on crossexamination that "'she said, "Go ahead.'" Resp. Brf. at 27 (quoting Boswell, 721 A.2d at
5

339) Defendant argues the facts here are unlike those in Boswell because when given the
opportunity to clarify, Officer Huntington could only give "conclusory testimony, stat[ing]
that he did not 'recall exactly other than it was consent,' and admitted he assumed he had
consent." Resp. Brf. at 27-28 (quoting R 84.38-40).
Defendant mischaractenzes the officer's testimony in Boswell, altogether omitting the
fact that just like Officer Huntington, the officer in Boswell also "stated that he could not
recall her exact words, but that she answered in the affirmative." Boswell, 721 A.2d at 339
The Pennsylvania court described the testimony as follows:
Trooper Knightly testified that the following exchange then took place
between Officer Howard and Boswell:
A: Officer Howard pointed down at the bag and said: "Is this your
bag?" She stated, "Yes, it is." Officer Howard then asked: "Would
you mind if I take a look inside this bag?" At that time, she said:
"Yes." The Court: Wait a minute, hold it. He said: "Would you
mind if I took a look inside this bag," and she said: "Yes," meaning
that she would mind, nght? A: No, that he could do it.
On cross- examination, Trooper Knightly clarified that when asked
if she would mind if they looked in her bag, she said, 'Go ahead.'
He stated that he could not recall her exact words, but that she
answered in the m the affirmative
Id. at 338-39
The form of Officer Huntington's testimony was nearly identical to that of Officer
Howard's in Boswell. See Pet. Brf. at 21-28 As in Boswell, only the officer testified at the
suppression heanng. See id. at 343. As in Boswell, the officer's "uncontradicted testimony
was that he did not recall [defendant's] exact words," but that defendant's response to the
question of whether he would mind if he searched "was in the affirmative " Id And as in
6

Boswell, defendant "did not present any evidence to support [his] claim that [he] did not
consent." Id. As such, Officer Huntington's testimony constituted "substantial, competent
evidence" of consent. See Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at f 42. In sum, the court of appeals erred
in concluding that the trial court's finding of consent was clearly erroneous. It reached that
conclusion because it erroneously applied a presumption against waiver.1
D. The "Substantial, Competent Evidence" Standard for Clear Error Is the Same
as the "Clear Weight of the Evidence" Standard.
Some confusion may also arise by Eisner's holding that it will find a trial court's
factual findings clearly erroneous if they "are not 'supported by substantial, competent
evidence.'" Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at \ 42 (quoting Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687). Utah appellate
courts have not often referred to this "substantial evidence" standard in criminal ; ^ses. It
most frequently appears in civil cases addressing the findings of a trial court or
administrative agency. See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687 (citing 50 West Broadway Associates
v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989)).

defendant's argument relies in large part on the false premise that whether or not
he consented to a search is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. See Resp. Brf. at
17-18. While "[voluntariness is primarily a factual question," State v. Thurman, 846
P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993), this Court has reviewed consent findings as mixed
questions of fact and law. As discussed in the State's opening brief, the ultimate issue of
whether a consent is voluntary is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness; on the other
hand, whether consent was in fact given and the scope of that consent are underlying
factual determinations reviewed for clear error. See Pet. Brf. at 20-21. Eisner does not
hold otherwise. See Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at \ 42 (holding that "[t]he question of whether
a party has voluntarily consented to a search is a question of law, and we therefore review
it for correctness").
7

Whereas Bisner and Arroyo referred to the "clearly erroneous" standard in terms of
"substantial, competent evidence," this Court has generally characterized the standard
somewhat differently. Generally, the Court has held that clear error will only be found
"when viewing the evidence in a light mostfavorable to the trial court s ruling, the evidence
is insufficient to support the trial court's findings." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 n.2,
1 P.3d 1108 (emphasis in original). "In other words, an appellant must show that the trial
court's findings so lack support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making
them clearly erroneous." Id. (internal quotes omitted). Unless the appellate court is "left
with a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,'" clear error will not
be found. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). This "clear weight of the
evidence" standard is arguably the best articulation of clear error.
The substantial evidence standard, however, suggests nothing different. Because
appellate decisions from criminal convictions are virtually silent on the meaning of
"substantial, competent evidence," decisions from civil and administrative cases are
instructive. This Court has held that the "substantial evidence" standard "'does not require
or specify a quantity of evidence but requires only such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Harken Southwest Corp. v. Board
of Oil Gas and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Utah 1996) (quoting U.S. West Comms., Inc.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 882 P.2d 141, 146 (Utah 1994)) (other internal quotes omitted)
(discussing substantial evidence standard required under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g));
accord First Nat'I Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163,1165 (Utah
8

1990). Simply stated, "[a] trial court's findings cannot be made up out of whole cloth." 50
West Broadway Associates, 784 P.2d at 1171 (this case cited in Arroyo).
Under the substantial evidence standard, the Court "will not substitute its judgment
as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though [it] may have come to a different
conclusion." Tasters Ltd. v. Dep 't of Employment Security, 819 P.2d 361, 365 (Utah App.
1991). In other words, "if the evidence is such where reasonable men could arrive at
different conclusions, [the Court is] prohibited from interfering." In re Swan's Estate, 51
Utah 410, 170 P. 452, 456 (Utah 1918); accord State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 107
(Utah 1980). Accordingly, like the "clear weight of the evidence" formulation, a party
challenging a finding as not supported by substantial and competent evidence "'must first
marshal all the evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the findings even in viewing it in the light most favorable to
the court below.'" Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry,
886 P.2d 514, 519 (Utah 1994); see Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108
As argued above and in the State's opening brief, the trial court's finding that
defendant consented to the search was not clearly erroneous, whichever articulation of the
clearly erroneous standard is used. As such, the court of appeals erred in reversing that
finding.
* * *

In summary, the court of appeals erred in employing the "presumption against waiver"
test. Because only the second prong of that test survives Schneckloth, this Court should
9

reject it in its entirety in favor of the test enunciated in Schneckloth and its progeny. That test
is best articulated as follows:
After making the threshold factual finding that a defendant consented to a search, the
trial court must determine whether the consent "was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product
of duress or coercion, express or implied." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 204748; accord Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at f 47. In determining whether a consent was given
voluntarily, the court must look to "'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances,'
including] ; 1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence
of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the
owner of the [property]; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer.'"
Bisner,200\ UT 99, at f 47 (quoting State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980));
see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct at 2047-48. "Even when a
constitutionally valid consent is given, the scope of the ensuing search must be limited to the
scope of the consent

" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1218 (Utah 1993).

A trial court's determination regarding consent to search is a mixed question of fact
and law. "The question of whether a party has voluntarily consented to a search is a question
of law... review[ed] [ ] for correctness." Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at f 42. However, the factual
findings underlying the court's conclusion, including whether or not consent was in fact
given and the scope of that consent, are reviewed for clear error. See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at
687; see also Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at f 42.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in the State's opening brief, the State respectfully
requests the Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted this JO day of March, 2002.
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